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Abstract 
 
Estimating the causal effect of unionization on business survival rates is difficult in the absence 
of large, representative data on establishments with union status information. It is also 
confounded by selection bias, because unions may tend to organize at highly profitable 
enterprises that are more likely to survive.  Using new data on more than 27,000 establishments 
that faced organizing drives in the U.S. during 1983-1999, this paper utilizes a regression 
discontinuity design to estimate the impact of unionization on the probability of employer 
dislocation. Survival probabilities of employers where unions barely won the election (e.g. by one 
vote) are compared to those where the unions barely lost.  The analysis yields a surprising result: 
little or no union effect on business dislocation rates over 1- to 18-year horizons.  
                                            
* An earlier version of the paper “The Impact of Unionization on Establishment Closure: A Regression Discontinuity 
Analysis of Representation Elections” is on-line as NBER Working Paper #8993, June 2002. We thank David Card, 
Larry Katz, Enrico Moretti, Morris Kleiner, participants of the University of Michigan Labor Workshop and the NBER 
Labor Studies Summer Institute for helpful comments and suggestions, Matthew Butler and Francisco Martorell for 
outstanding research assistance, Hank Farber for providing election data, and Christina Lee for reading previous drafts. 1 Introduction
It is widely understood that unions raise the cost of labor by raising members’ wages above market
rates.1 Unions also impose other costs on employers - limiting discretion in hiring and ﬁring, for example,
and altering the structure of pay differentials across skill groups. A key question for understanding the
social costs of unionization is whether the wage premiums and other costs of unionism create large or
small distortions in the allocation of labor.2 These distortions can take the form of reduced employment at
unionized ﬁrms, or most dramatically, an accelerated pace of business failures.
The potentially adverse effects of unions on ﬁrm survival are acknowledged by employers and
employees alike. During union organizing drives, ﬁrms routinely threaten to close a plant if the union drive
is successful [Bronfenbrenner 2000]. Employees seem to take these threats seriously: the risk of plant
closure is cited as the leading cause of union withdrawal from organizing attempts [Commission for Labor
Cooperation 1997]. Such risks are arguably higher now, in light of rapidly expanding trade with low-wage
countries such as China and Mexico, and increasing international capital mobility.3
Despite the clear theoretical presumption and strong anecdotal evidence, the magnitude of the ef-
fect of unions on establishment or ﬁrm survival is uncertain. One limiting factor is the absence of large,
representative data sets that track establishments over time and provide information on union status.4 A
second and even more important concern is the fact that unionization is nonrandom. Depending on the
correlation between factors associated with higher or lower risks of survival, and higher or lower likelihood
1 See Lewis [1986].
2 The presence of a “deadweight welfare loss” to unionization is a staple of textbook treatments of unionization. Even Freeman
and Medoff [1984] - whose emphasis is on the possible “efﬁciency enhancing” aspect of trade unionism - stipulate the existence
of such a welfare loss. More recently, the cross-country analysis of Nickell and Layard [1999] suggest that a change from 25 to
over 70 percent of the workers covered by collective bargaining is associated with a doubling of the unemployment rate. Lalonde,
Marschke, and Troske [1996], using a “difference-in-difference” approach with LRD data, ﬁnd successful organization is associated
with signiﬁcant declines in subsequent employment and output.
3 The Commission for Labor Cooperation, a tri-national organization created under the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (“NAALC”) in response to labor issues related to NAFTA, called for a study on the impact of plant closings on union
organizing in the three countries.
4 This has led researchers to use creative data collection methods to examine these questions. For example, Freeman and Kleiner
[1990] conducted on-site interviews of 364 establishments that experienced representation elections in the Boston and Kansas
City NLRB districts. Bronars and Deere [1993] construct a dataset of NLRB elections to COMPUSTAT data to construct a
panel of 85 ﬁrms over a 20-year period. Freeman and Kleiner [1999] also use COMPUSTAT to construct a sample of 319 ﬁrms.
Lalonde, Marschke, and Troske [1996] match NLRB representation elections to a subset of manufacturing establishments that are
continuously operating in the LRD to create samples with 500 to about 1100 observations.
1of unionization, the observed correlation between union status and survival may overstate or understate the
true effects of unions. Two competing phenomena may induce opposite selectivity biases. On the one hand,
unions may tend to organize at highly proﬁtable enterprises that are more likely to survive. On the other, a
union organizing drive may be more likely to succeed when a ﬁrm is poorly managed, or has faced recent
difﬁculties.
In this paper, we present quasi-experimental evidence on the causal effect of unionization on the
probability of business failures/re-locations, using a new database that is representative of U.S. establish-
ments at risk of being unionized. Our analysis is based on the fact that most new unionization occurs as
a result of a secret ballot election. By law, a majority vote in favor of the union requires management to
recognize the union and bargain “in good faith”. This process creates a natural set of comparisons between
establishments that faced elections where the union barely won (say, by one vote) and those that faced
elections where the union barely lost (by one vote). As in other regression discontinuity designs, the com-
parison between near winners and near losers eliminates any confounding selection and omitted variable
biases, and allows us to devise credible and transparent estimates of the effect of unions on ﬁrm survival.5
Our analysis yields a surprising result: we estimate a very small union recognition effect on em-
ployer survival, on the order of 1 percent. The estimates are stable across different time horizons (from
1- to 18-years), and across industry, and different establishment sizes. Moreover, we ﬁnd strong empirical
support for the basic requirement of our research design. Close winners and losers look similar in industry
composition, size of the bargaining unit, and other pre-determined characteristics.
A potential concern is that unions that barely lose elections nonetheless have a relatively good
chance of eventually becoming recognized, while those that barely win face a high risk of decertiﬁcation.
The “treatment” of a close union victory would have little long-run consequence to the ﬁrm, which would
naturally lead to small long-run effects on business survival. We ﬁnd no empirical support for this hypoth-
esis. There is a striking discontinuity in the relationship between the union vote share and our independent
5 Regression discontinuity designs are described in Thistlethwaite and Campbell [1960] and Campbell [1969], and formally
examined as an identiﬁcation strategy recently in Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw [2001]. More recent examples include Angrist
and Lavy [1998], and van der Klaauw [1996].
2proxy for union presence (the ﬁling of a contract expiration notice) many years after the election.
One explanation for the small effect of unions on ﬁrm survival is that the costs imposed by newly
organized unions are small.6 This possibility would seem at odds with the extensive literature on union
wage premiums and other research showing signiﬁcant effects on proﬁtability.7 I tw o u l da l s ob ea to d d s
with the fact that NLRB representation elections are nearly always contentious. Why would employers
s p e n dr e s o u r c e so nr e s i s t i n ga no r g a n i z i n gd r i v ei fu n i o n sd i dn o ti m p o s es i g n i ﬁcantly higher future costs?
And why would unions spend resources on organizing if there were nothing to gain from a victory? A
simple model of optimal union organizing actually suggests that these potential gains should be larger
when the vote is close than when the union is certain to prevail. A larger wage gain is needed to offset the
lower probability of winning the election, in order to justify the ﬁxed costs of an organizing drive. All of
this suggests that the costs of new unionization are likely to be important.
We therefore conclude that unions likely do not affect businesses by making them more susceptible
to failure or re-location, despite the fears of many employers and employees. While not affecting the
survivability of aﬁrm, unionscouldnonetheless cause slower employment growth. Ourdataprovide limited
evidence on this “within-ﬁrm” effect: we estimate a negative employment response of 7 percent among
surviving establishments, but with standard errors of the same magnitude. Our estimates on employment
can rule out the large magnitudes that would be needed to fully explain the decline in union density since
the early 1980s. On the other hand, even with the more than 27,000 establishments in our data set, we
cannot rule out either small or moderate-sized elasticities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical strategy, and summarizes our
main ﬁndings. Section 3 discusses the conditions for a valid regression discontinuity design in our context,
and outlines a simple economic model to describe the interaction of employers, unions, and workers in the
context of a representation election. Section 4 places our analysis in the context of industrial relations in the
U.S., and describes some important aspects of our data. We present the main results in Section 5, discuss
6 Freeman and Kleiner [1990] ﬁnd in their survey of 364 ﬁrms, quite modest wage effects associated with new unionization, in
contrast to that implied by the typical study based on micro data on individuals.
7 For example, see Ruback and Zimmerman [1984], and Abowd [1989].
3their economic implications in Section 6, and suggest directions for future research in Section 7.
2 Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Establishment Survival and
Unionization: Basic Facts
We begin by brieﬂy describing our research design and summarizing our main results. Our regres-
sion discontinuity analysis suggests that there is virtually no causal impact of unionization on survival rates
of business establishments.
The primary challenge of identifying the impact of unionization is one of isolating exogenous
variation in the union “status” of an establishment, while keeping all other pre-determined characteristics of
the establishment “constant”. A simple comparison of survival rates between unionized and non-unionized
ﬁrms suffers from the potential endogeneity of union status. For example, ﬁrms with larger economic rents
m a yb em o r el i k e l yt os u r v i v e ,a n dbecause of those rents, are more likely to generate worker demand for a
union.
In this paper, we exploit a distinctive feature of the union recognition process in the U.S. that we
argue generates “as good as randomized” variation in union status. In the U.S. the obligation of employers
to bargain “in good faith” with a union is almost alwasy determined through a majority secret-ballot vote
amongst the workers; this “representation election” is overseen by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB). We argue that it is plausible that there is at least some degree of unpredictability regarding the
eventual vote tally, so that the ﬁrms and unions involved in elections where the union barely won (say, by
one vote) are likely to be ex ante comparable to those ﬁrms and unions involved in elections where the
union barely lost ( b yo n ev o t e ) . I ft h i si st r u e–t h a tt h e ya r ec o m p a r a b l e“ i na l lo t h e rw a y s ”–t h e nt h e
difference in the survival rates subsequent to the election can be attributed to a causal impact of the union
certiﬁcation.
Figure Ia graphically summarizes our main empirical ﬁnding. Using data on NLRB representation
elections conducted between 1983 and 1999, it plots the proportion of employers that are still in business
by the year 2001, by the actual share of the votes in favor of the union. Each dot represents an average
4among elections within a 0.05 interval of the vote share. All points to the left of the 0.50 line represent
establishmentswheretheunionlostthecertiﬁcation election, andthosetotherightrepresentunionvictories.
If unionization substantially impacted ability of the employer to remain economically viable – a claim
frequently touted by employers during organizing drives [Bronfenbrenner 1994, Kleiner 2001] – we would
expect to see a sharp drop in survival rates at the 0.50 threshold. No drop is evident in Figure Ia.
We interpret this smooth empirical relation through the 0.50 threshold as evidence that there is
little or no causal effect of union status on employer survival. Two alternative explanations to the pattern
in Figure Ia are 1) employers in which the union barely won and lost are not ex ante comparable, perhaps
because there is no unpredictability in the outcome of the election, and that there is “sorting” of unions and
employers on either side of the 0.50 threshold and 2) the intensity of the “treatment” is small among the
employers and unions involved in close elections – that is, an employer that prevents union certiﬁcation by
1 vote must make wage concessions as large as they would have had the union won by 1 vote.
As we will discuss in greater detail in later sections, there are several reasons why the two interpre-
tations are difﬁcult to reconcile with the implications of a simple economic model of the election process,
as well as with the empirical evidence we present. First, if the exact vote tally could be predicted with com-
plete certainty, it is difﬁcult to explain why a union would expend resources to ultimately lose an organizing
drive. At the very least, if vote tallies could be perfectly predicted for a substantial fraction of the election
cases (and if there were systematic “sorting” around the 0.50 threshold) we would expect to see a sharp
drop in the relative frequency of observed elections in which the union barely lost an election. In fact, as
Appendix Table II and Appendix Figure I show, union losses are at least as common as union victories, and
the distribution of vote shares looks approximately normal, centered around 0.40, with no sharp drop in the
relative frequency of bare union losses.
More importantly, we present evidence below that employers and elections, in fact, look quite
similar along many pre-determined characteristics on either side of the 0.50 threshold, as predicted by
our implicit assumption of “as good as random” assignment. As one example, Figure Ic plots averages
of our “union presence before the election” proxy – an indicator of whether a contract expiration notice
5was ﬁled prior to the election – against the election vote share for the union.8 The ﬁgure reveals no sharp
change in pre-election “union presence” around the 0.50 percent threshold, suggesting that at least along
this dimension, employers involved in close wins and losses appear comparable.
Furthermore, the economic model we outline below illustrates that while the expected union wage
could be expected to be higher given a higher probability that the union will win, we might also expect
employers to offer a higher non-union wage in order to persuade some workers to vote against the union.
Therefore, the gap between the expected union and non-union wage may not necessarily rise with the
probability of a union victory. Actually, the minimum union-non-union wage gap needed in order to justify
the unions’ costs of conducting an organizing drive must be larger for elections in which there is a lower
probability of a union victory. Put simply, it would be unlikely that an election would be conducted if the
union had nothing to gain from winning (i.e. if the expected “treatment” is zero).
More importantly, we present evidence that is inconsistent with the hypothesis that union certiﬁ-
cation among close elections is ineffectual in altering union power. Figure Ib is analogous to Figure Ic,
except we plot averages of our proxy for “union presence” subsequent to the NLRB representation election.
It exhibits a striking discontinuity at the 0.50 threshold, suggesting that the certiﬁcation has a signiﬁcant
causal inﬂuence in altering union power. Thus, it is evident in the data that something is “at stake” among
these election cases.
The remainder of the paper explains in greater detail the above reasons why we interpret our ﬁnd-
ings as evidence of little or no causal impact of unionization on employer survivorship.
3 Econometric Framework
3.1 Reduced-Form Regression Discontinuity Framework
In the context of union representation elections, the internal validity of our regression discontinuity analysis
primarily depends on two assumptions: 1) that the “treatment” (union recognition) is a known, discontinu-
8 T h es a m p l ef o rt h eﬁgure includes only those employers that have survived as of the year 2001. Below we discuss how to
interpret these graphs in light of sample selection bias.
6ousfunctionof an observed variable (thevotesfor theunion), and2)thatthere is at leastsome unpredictable
component of the exact vote tally that has a smooth continuous distribution. U.S. labor law ensures 1); the
importance of 2) is discussed below within a reduced-form econometric framework. We outline sufﬁcient
stochastic assumptions for identifying union effects in our context.
Suppose an employeroutcome, suchas thepropensity oftheestablishment to survive, is determined
by the equation
y∗
j = Xjγ + WINjβ + εj (1)
where y∗
jis the survival propensity, and WINj is an indicator variable determining whether the union won
the representation election for employer j. Xj denotes all other pre-determined characteristics (observable
and unobservable) that inﬂuence establishment survival and εj an independent error term.
It is clear that a “regression” of y∗
j on WINj will in general yield an inconsistent estimate of β
if any components of Xj also determine WINj. As one example, Xj could represent the magnitude of
the ﬁrm’s economic rents, and it is plausible that unions are more likely to prevail in organizing drives in
ﬁrms that enjoy high rents, because workers are less concerned that a union-induced wage gain will harm
the economic viability of the employer. In particular, the NLRB election process implies that WINj is
determined by
WINj =
½
1 if Vj > 1
2
0 if Vj ≤ 1
2
(2)
Vj = v(Xj)+Uj
where Vj is the vote share for the union, and v(·) is a function of Xj.9
The endogeneity of Xj is clear here. Another way of viewing the problem is that the distribution
of Xj, conditional on a union win, will in general be different from the distribution conditional on a union
loss. More formally, (assuming that Xj has ﬁnite and discrete support) Pr
£
Xj = x|Vj > 1
2
¤
will generally
not equal Pr
£
Xj = x|Vj ≤ 1
2
¤
for any x.
9 To be more precise, one could let Vj = Λ(v (Xj)+Uj) where Λ is a transformation from the real line to the [0,1] interval.
7On the other hand, if Uj is continuously distributed, the distribution of Xj conditional on a bare
union victory will be arbitrarily close to the distribution conditional on a bare union loss. That is,
Pr
·
Xj = x|Vj =
1
2
+ ∆
¸
≈ Pr
·
Xj = x|Vj =
1
2
− ∆
¸
(3)
for all x in the support of Xj,a s∆ approaches zero.10 This is the sense in which examining closer and
closer elections can result in employers involved in union victories and losses becoming more similar along
all other observable and unobservable characteristics. Thus, a test of the continuity of the distribution of
Uj is to examine if elections appear different along observable pre-determined characteristics of employers
involved in elections just below and above the 0.50 threshold.
In practice, rather than specifying functional forms for the distributions of Xjγ and εj to estimate
a normalized β, we will directly estimate Pr
£
Survival|Vj = 1
2 + ∆
¤
−Pr
£
Survival|Vj = 1
2 + ∆
¤
(the
discontinuity “gap” at 0.50 illustrated in Figures Ia-Ic). It is clear that a negative (positive) difference
implies a negative (positive) impact β of unionization on employer survival propensities.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
While our data are not sufﬁciently rich to allow estimation of a dynamic structural model of union and ﬁrm
behavior, we present a simple economic model provides a framework for interpreting our estimates and
for describing the election context. Drawing upon ideas in Rosen (1969), we present a simple economic
framework that describes the ﬁrst-order objectives and constraints of the various participants in the NLRB
election process.11 Below, we show that the key identifying assumption (continuity of the distribution of
Uj at Vj = 1
2) is a natural consequence of this simple economic model of the election process.
Consider the structural relation between employer survival propensities and the wage Wj
y∗
j = αWj + εj (4)
10 To see this, note that the density of v (Xj)+Uj conditional on Xj – f (v|Xj = x) – is continuous in v. Therefore, by Bayes’
Law,
f(v|Xj=x)·Pr[Xj=x]
P
f(v|Xj=x)·Pr[Xj=x] =P r [ Xj = x|v (x)+Uj = v] is continuous in v. Actually, all that is needed is continuity in v at
v =
1
2
11 The model presented below has a similarity to those used to model ﬁnal offer arbitration [see Farber, 1980; Ashenfelter and
Bloom 1984]. Here, the union and management put forth wage “offers” optimally, given expectations of the preferences of the
voters/employees, which are unknown to the two bargaining parties. The outcome of the election is akin to the decision process of
an “arbitrator”.
8α is assumed to be negative, so that a higher wage leads to a higher probability that the employer is forced
to shut down. Note however, that even if α is negative, given the necessarily non-linear relation between a
probability and Wj, it could very well be that the marginal effect of Wj on the probability of survival could
be small.
As in Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), we assume that there are three separate agents, 1) the em-
ployer, 2) the union leadership, and 3) the workers – the voters – in the potential bargaining unit. Manage-
ment and the union each offer different levels of wages to the workers, and the workers vote for or against
the union, based on those choices, so that we have
Wj = WU
j WINj + WN
j (1 − WINj) (5)
WINj =1
µ
Vj >
1
2
¶
where WU
j and WN
j are the wages offered by the union and management, respectively. This implies the
relation
y∗
j = αWN
j + α
¡
WU
j − WN
j
¢
WINj + εj (6)
so that the causal effect of the union is represented by α
³
WU
j − WN
j
´
.
Workers When considering whether or not to vote in favor of the union, the worker weighs the beneﬁt
of gaining a higher wage against the costs of a potentially higher probability that she will not retain employ-
ment at the ﬁrm. A lower probability of retaining the job may arise either because the union will induce the
employer to shut down or move, or induce the employer to scale back employment. Indeed, a worker may
ﬁnd the wage (and its consequences) offered by the management to be more reasonable and individually
desirable. We describe the aggregate voting behavior of the workers as
Vj = v
¡
WU
j ,WN
j
¢
+ Uj (7)
where v(·) translates the offered wages into a predictable component of the ultimate vote tally, and Uj is
the unpredictable (by all agents in the model) component of the union vote share.12
12 Again, we could be more precise instead specifying G
−1 (Vj)=v
¡
W
U
j ,W
N
j
¢
+Uj,w h e r eG is a one-to-one transformation
from the real line to the [0,1] interval.
9The shape of v(·) characterizes the workers’ preferences. We assume that ∂v
∂W U
j and ∂v
∂W N
j are both
negative, capturing the notion that if the union raises the offer, it will lose the voters who are indifferent
between the union’s and management’s offers. Similarly, the management can gain more “no” votes by
promising a higher wage WN
j .
Employer The management seeks to maximize proﬁts, weighing the beneﬁts of offering a lower wage
against the cost that lowering the wage induces a higher probability that the union will win, resulting in a
higher wage WU
j .T h eﬁrm’s optimal choice of WN
j can be expressed as
WN∗
j =argmax
W N
j
H
¡
WN
j ,WU
j ,Pr[WINj =1 ]
¢
(8)
where H (·) is the employer’s objective function. An example of a speciﬁc form for the objective function
is the expected proﬁts, given the employer’s and union’s wage offers:
H
¡
WN
j ,WU
j ,Pr[WINj =1 ]
¢
= π
¡
WN
j
¢
Pr[WINj =0 ]+π
¡
WU
j
¢
Pr[WINj =1 ] (9)
where π(·) is the proﬁt function.
Union The union leadership seeks to raise wages above that offered by the employer, but by offering
higher wages, it reduces the probability of winning the election. The union’s optimal choice of WU
j facing
the ﬁrm’s offer WN
j can be written as
WU∗
j =argmax
W U
j
J
¡
WU
j ,WN
j ,Pr[WINj =1 ]
¢
(10)
where J (·) is the union’s objective function. An example of a possible form for this objective function is
the expected net beneﬁt (expressed in dollars) for the union:
J
¡
WU
j ,WN
j ,Pr[WINj =1 ]
¢
= −c +P r[ WINj =1 ]U
¡
WU
j − WN
j
¢
(11)
where c is a ﬁxed cost to conducting an organizing drive, and U (·) is a beneﬁt function with U (0) = 0.13
In a Nash equilibrium, in anticipation of how the workers will vote (on average), and given the
correct expectation of the other party’s wage offer, union and management optimally choose their wage
13 In principle, U (·) could be decreasing in the wage gap at some point, if the union also gives weight to the employer’s survival
and/or the level of employment. However, it is easy to imagine that in many election cases U (·) is increasing in the wage gap in
equilbrium.
10offers to maximize their objective functions.
Implications It is clear from Equation 11 that if the outcomes of elections were known ex ante with
certainty – if there were no Uj component – we should expect to observe no elections in which unions lose,
if conducting an organizing drive is costly. In fact, as shown in Appendix Table II, over the sample period,
the average vote share for the union and win rates are around 0.48 and 0.427, respectively. Furthermore, if
in a large fraction of election cases, the outcome of a potential election were perfectly foreseen, we would
expect to see a sharp drop in the relative frequency of a “close” union election loss. Appendix Figure I
shows that empirically there is no such sharp drop; the distribution of vote shares is approximately normal,
centered around 0.35 to 0.40. Our framework provides an intuitive explanation for these patterns: for every
election, there is some ex ante probability (however small) that the union will prevail. In other words,
t h e r ei ss o m eu n p r e d i c t a b i l i t yi nt h eﬁnal vote count. This would explain why unions would participate in
elections that they so happen to eventually lose.
Furthermore, presuming the existence of an unpredictable component Uj to the ultimate vote share,
the framework above implies that the distribution of Uj would be continuous at Vj = v
³
WU∗
j ,WN∗
j
´
+
Uj = 1
2.Thisisbecauseadiscontinuityin thedistribution of Uj atVj = 1
2 isinconsistent with theoptimality
of WU∗
j and WN∗
j for the union and management. This is because such a discontinuity would imply that
Pr[WINj =1 ]would be discontinuous in WU
j and WN
j at WU∗
j ,W N∗
j .14 A se v i d e n tf r o mE q u a t i o n s
9 and 11, if this were the case, WU∗
j (WN∗
j ) would not be optimal, since the union (management) could
lower (raise) wages by an arbitrarily small amount to affect a sharp rise (fall) in the probability of a union
victory.15 Intuitively, no ﬁrm or union would settle with making a wage offer that could be altered a tiny
amount in order to cause a discontinuous increase in the probability that the election would result in their
favor. Thus, the existence of Nash Equilibria gives a theoretical justiﬁcation of the validity of the regression
discontinuity approach described above.
14 To see this, note that Pr[WIN j = 1]=F
¡
v
¡
W
U∗
j ,W
N∗
j
¢
−
1
2
¢
,w h e r eF (·) is the cdf of −Uj. A discontinuity in the
distribution of −Uj at Vj =
1
2,i m p l i e st h a tF (·) is discontinuous at v
¡
W
U∗
j ,W
N∗
j
¢
−
1
2.A s l o n g a s v
¡
W
U∗
j ,W
N∗
j
¢
is a
continuous function of its arguments at W
U∗
j ,W
N∗
j ,t h e nPr[WIN j = 1] is discontinuous in W
U
j ,W
N
j at W
U∗
j ,W
N∗
j .
15 This is true as long as the proﬁtf u n c t i o nπ(·) and beneﬁt function U (·) are continuous.
11Nevertheless, we reiterate that the internal validity of the design can be empirically evaluated. It
is a testable proposition whether or not the examination of close elections yields “treated” and “control”
employers that look comparable along the observable dimensions of Xj.16
4 Background
4.1 Institutional Background: the industrial relations climate and the NLRB
Election Process
Our sample of establishments is limited to the employers that are at risk for becoming “unionized.” Thus,
before proceeding any further, it will be instructive to place our analysis in the context of labor relations
and the conduct of representation elections in the U.S.
The administration of fair, secret ballot elections to determine union recognition is one of the chief
responsibilities of the NLRB, the most signiﬁcantadministrativeagencytobeaconsequenceoftheNational
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) – the Wagner Act – of the 1930s. The law has been changing continuously
since its enactment, most notably with the passage of Taft–Hartley Acts in 1947 (which among other things,
provided for temporary government seizure of struck facilities in the event of a strike that creates an “emer-
gency”) and the Landrum–Grifﬁn Act of 1959 (which among other things, outlawed a number of successful
union tactics including “secondary boycotts”). In principle, the NLRA provides a neutral setting in which
the right for workers to bargain collectively is enforced.
It is important to note thatwhere U.S. law gives workers the rightto unionize, an NLRB representa-
tion election is not required. In general, nothing prevents an employer from recognizing a union without the
formalities of an election. Voluntary recognition of a union, however, is thought to be quite rare, and em-
ployers generally will attempt to resist an organizing drive. With data on ﬁrms who faced NLRB elections
in the early 1990s, Brofenbrenner (1994) documents that most employers used multiple tactics to delay or
deny a collective bargaining agreement. Among the most common are
16 As in any empirical investigation, it is impossible to rule out violation of the identifying assumption, but we can test the
restriction of the research design that observable characteristics are roughly balanced between the union-win and union-loss groups
of employers.
121. “Captive meetings”. While employers are prohibited from directly ﬁring workers because of lawful
union activity, at captive meetings employers are allowed to inform workers of the possible (dire) con-
sequences of unionization, including making the business more susceptible to closure.
2. Firing union activists. While “prohibited," the penalty imposed on employers, if found guilty, is gen-
erally quite minor – reinstatement with back pay. Indeed, the costs have been perceived as so minor
that Freeman (1985) observes that the notices that ﬁrms are required to post when they engage in illegal
ﬁring are referred to as “hunting licenses."
3. Hire a “management consultant" who advises employers on a variety of tactics to discourage unioniza-
tion.17
4. Alleging unfair labor practices, disputing the choice of bargaining unit, etc.18
Against this backdrop of employer opposition to unionization, it is perhaps not surprising that there
is no single path to an NLRB election and eventual recognition of the union by the employer. Nonetheless,
it is useful to describe a prototypical scenario that results in a establishment agreeing to bargain with its
workers through a labor union:
1. A group of workers decide to try to form a union. These workers contact a labor union and ask for
assistance in beginning an organizing drive.
2. In collaboration with the union, the employees begin a “card drive." The purpose of the card drive is to
be able to petition the NLRB to hold an election. Unions generally seek to get cards from at least 50
percent of the workers in the 6 month period of time usually allowed (although in principle, only 30%
is required to be granted an election by the NLRB.)
3. After the cards have been submitted, the NLRB makes a ruling on whether the people the union seeks
to represent have a “community of interest” – basically form a coherent group for the purposes of
bargaining. The NLRB makes a determination of which categories of employees fall within the union’s
“bargaining unit.” Often the parties will differ on the appropriate bargaining unit – employers generally
prefer larger and more heterogenous groupings than do unions.
4. Next, the NLRB holds an election at the work site (with exceptions to account for such things as the
vagaries of employment seasonality). A simple majority (50 percent plus 1 vote) for one union is all that
is required to win.19
5. Within 7 days after the ﬁnal tally of the ballots, parties can ﬁle objections to how the election was
conducted. In principle, with sufﬁcient evidence that the election was not carried out properly, the
NLRB can rule to invalidate the outcome of an election, and conduct another one thereafter. Speciﬁc
ballots cannot be challenged after the voting is completed.
6. If after this, a union still has a simple majority, then the employer is, in principle, obligated to negotiate
“in good faith.”
Two aspects of the industrial relations climate deem our sample of establishments particularly ap-
17 For a colorful, albeit idiosyncratic discussion see Levitt (1993).
18 In the case of graduate students at universities, for example, employers have often attempted to argue – sometimes suc-
cessfully – that graduate student employees are not “employees" but “students receiving ﬁnancial aid." Another example is
employers arguing that its employees are not workers but “independent contractors" who are not covered by the provisions of
NLRA.
19 If two unions split the vote 50-50, they both lose, and neither become certiﬁed.
13propriate for an analysis of the impact of unionization on employer outcomes.
First, that employers are thought to generally oppose organization drives [Kleiner 2001] suggests
that both parties have “something at stake” in the outcome of the election. For example, we expect that both
the union and management are expecting that a union win will generally lead to higher wages, more bene-
ﬁts, or better working conditions, at the cost of the employer. If very little were at stake, and if the elections
themselves were pro forma events, then we would not expect to see a signiﬁcant employer response to a
union election victory. Such a ﬁnding would say more about the small size of the “treatment” (“union-
ization”) than the potential magnitude of distortions caused by an aggressive union. This seems unlikely,
however, since we analyze establishments which faced NLRB elections. Such a focus would seem likely
to select establishments where union-management relations are contentious since in the overwhelming ma-
jority of cases the management of such establishments always has the option of voluntarily recognizing the
union without a (costly) NLRB election. Thus, it would seem more reasonable to assume that the outcome
of the election is far from inconsequential to both parties.
Second, combined with a contentious atmosphere, the secret-ballot nature of the vote undoubtedly
generates a certain amount of uncertainty in the outcome of the election, particularly when the vote is
expected to be close. As shown in Section 3 a certain degree of uncertainty is a crucial element to our
theoretical and econometric framework. The assumption of some randomness to the vote would likely not
be justiﬁed if union certiﬁcation could be secured through a public petition. For example, if all that was
required were 50 percent or more signatures, one could imagine that the sample of establishments/unions
where the unions submitted a petition with 51 percent of the signatures would be very different from a
(peculiar) group of establishments/unions where the workers submitted signatures that totalled 49 percent.
By contrast, it is very easy to imagine in a secret-ballot context that those unions that won 26 out of 50 votes
in a secret-ballot election possessed virtually the same ex ante chance of winning as unions that obtained
25 out of 50 votes (and lost).
144.2 Data Set Construction: the NLRB, FMCS, and InfoUSA, Inc.
Deferring the details to the Appendix, we summarize here the most important features of the dataset used in
the analysis. First, electronic records on all representation election cases handled by the NLRB in the ﬁscal
years from 1984 to 1999 were obtained. These records have information such as the dates of the ﬁling of
the petition, the election, and the closing of the case, as well as the eventual vote tallies, as well as other
characteristics such as the size of the voting unit, and the primary industry of the establishment in question.
Importantly, these ﬁles contain the establishment name and exact address. The names and addresses
alone were submitted to a commercial marketing database company called InfoUSA, Inc. InfoUSA main-
tains an annually updated list of all active business establishments (with a telephone listing) in the United
States. The basis for their database is the consolidation of virtually all telephone books in the country.
InfoUSA makes a brief call to each establishment at least once a year, to verify their existence, and to
update their information on various items such as 1) the total number of employees at the establishment, 2)
the estimated sales volume of the establishment, 3) the primary product of the business, and various other
characteristics. If InfoUSA found a record in their current database (as of May, 2001) with the same name
and address, they appended their information to the record. They were not given any information beyond
the name of the business and the street address.
This merged data was then additionally merged to a database of all contract expiration notices
between 1984 and February, 2001 – more than 500,000 case records – obtained from the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. According to the
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (29 CFR 1425.2)
In order that the Service may provide assistance to the parties, the party initiating negotiations
shall ﬁle a notice with the FMCS Notice Processing Unit ... at least 30 days prior to the expiration
or modiﬁcation date of an existing agreement, or 30 days prior to the reopener date of an existing
agreement...
Thus, in principle, parties to collective bargaining agreements are required to ﬁle so-called “30-
day notices” with the FMCS. This was used to obtain our proxy for the “presence” of a union at the
establishment – both before and after the election – under the presumption that contracts eventually expire,
15typically after two or three years.
There are a few important limitations to our data. First, our data do not constitute a true panel
dataset. We only observe “survival” or “death” as of one point in time - in the year 2001. We know
little about what happens between the time of the election and 2001, except the observation of contract
expirations at that particular location. While we do observe a few “baseline” characteristics from the NLRB
election ﬁle, InfoUSA does not retain historical records, so we do not have detailed employment and sales
data for period between the election and the year we observe survival status (2001).
Second, since we are measuring employer “survival” as a match (by name and address) in the
InfoUSA database, there will undoubtedly be some measurement error. Consequently, we will inevitably
treat some ﬁrms as having “died”, when instead we have simply been unable to match them. However,
while this may mean that estimates of the level of survival rates may be downward biased, it is highly
unlikely that establishments with close union winners are systematically less or more likely to match to the
InfoUSA database than counterpart close union losers, except if there is a true impact of union certiﬁcation
on survival probabilities.
Likewise, our measure of “union presence” will also likely be biased in levels, although this is
unlikely to have important consequences for our comparison of close winners to close losers. For example,
we understate the extent of unionization to the extent that our matching algorithm fails to locate a match
in the FMCS data when such a match exists or to the extent that noncompliance with the law (regarding
notifying the FMCS when a contract expires) is widespread. Alternatively, we overstate the extent of
unionization to the extent that our matching algorithm produces “false positive” matches. Although the
levels may be mis-measured, it seems reasonable to assume that these sources of measurement error are
unlikely to be systematically different between close winners and close losers. On balance, we believe the
beneﬁts of being able to compare the bare winners and losers on the basis of some other measure of “union
presence” other than the legal certiﬁcation that necessarily results from winning the election outweighs the
inability to obtain an accurate measure of the overall level of union presence.
164.3 Descriptive Statistics
Since the primary outcome of interest in this analysis is the survival probability of the employer, we ﬁrst
provide a broad picture of what our data implies about exit rates of establishments over time. Three im-
portant patterns emerge from our sample of establishments that experience NLRB representation elections:
1) as might be expected, establishments’ survival probabilities decline as one examines longer and longer
intervals, 2) employers where the organizing campaign succeeded have, on average, a lower probability
of surviving than those where the union was defeated, and 3) establishments’ death/exit rates appear to be
the dominant component to the overall decline in the total employment they provide over time. Table I
illustrates these basic patterns.
Table I and the subsequent analysis in this paper is essentially based on the universe of estab-
lishments that experienced NLRB representation elections between 1983 and 1999.20 The ﬁrst column of
Table I shows that in this sample, as would be expected, the probability of survival declines signiﬁcantly
as one examines longer and longer intervals. For example, the table shows that among the employers that
experienced NLRB representation elections in 1984, roughly 28 percent of them were still in existence as
of the year 2001. By contrast, about 58 percent of establishments that experienced an election in 1999
had survived as of 2001. The survival probability grows monotonically as we examine more recent elec-
tions; this would be expected if the establishments that experienced elections were, on average, comparable
over time. The implied exit rates are comparable to other estimates from existing research that utilizes
establishment-level longitudinal data.21
The next three columns of Table I show that establishments where unions were recognized are, on
average, less likely to survive both in the short- and long-run. For example, among elections that occurred
in 1999, 54 percent of those employers where the union won were still “alive” by the year 2001, compared
20 The NLRB election data are representation election cases that are disposed within the ﬁscal years from 1984 to 1999; thus,
most of the elections were held between the years of 1983 and 1999, with a few elections occuring before 1983.
21 For example, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson [1989] report a 5-year exit rate of about 40 percent, as calculated from Census of
Manufacturing data (1967-1977). And an analysis of food-manufacturing plants by McGuckin, Nguyen, and Reznek [1998] imply
a 10-year exit rate of about 60 percent in the LRD from 1977 to 1987. As seen in Table I, the corresponding implied exit rates in
our data are 48 and 59 percent respectively.
17to 61 percent for the non-unionized employers. There is also a difference in survival rates 13 years after
the election (elections in 1988). Averaging across all years yields a statistically signiﬁcant difference of 3
percentage points. Presumably, this difference reﬂects a combination of both the causal impact of union
recognition on survival, and the likelihood that there are systematic differences between employers that
won or lost the election.
Taken together, the ﬁfth and ninth columns in Table I suggest that in this sample, employer death
or exit is a signiﬁcant component in the decline of total employment provided by employers over time.22
Amongemployers that faced electionsin1984, theaverageemployment level -where“dead” employersare
counted as having zero employment - is about 61, while the corresponding numbers for elections conducted
in the late 90s are over 100.23 By contrast, the average log employment (ninth column) conditional on
survival by 2001 appears to be relatively stable over time. This implies that much of the decline over time
in the average employment provided by establishments operates through the “deaths” of employers.24
Finally, the differences between the 10th and 11th columns show that, conditional on survival,
employment levels are much smaller among employers where the union was victorious. Again, this dif-
ference (an average of 0.22 in logs over the entire sample period) presumably reﬂects a combination of
both the causal impact of unionization on employment levels, and a selection bias resulting from systematic
differences between employers that do and do not successfully resist an organizing campaign.
A more detailed examination of the differences between employers where the union won or lost
the election reveals three additional patterns: 1) establishments where unions won are signiﬁcantly smaller,
in terms of sales volume as measured in 2001, than those where unions lost, 2) across establishments, the
election outcome is signiﬁcantly associated with our own proxy of union presence constructed from the
FMCS data, and 3) the election outcome is also associated with several other pre-determined characteristics
of the establishment (e.g. industry, size of the voting unit).
22 The employment variable is employment level, as of the year 2001. The variable comes from the InfoUSA, Inc. database.
23 All “dead” establishments were assigned zero employment. There are 17622-16355=1267 missing values for employment
among the surviving employers as of 2001.
24 Longitudinal evidence indicates that establishment “deaths” alone can account for a signiﬁcant share of job destruction in the
manufacturing sector. On average, 25 percent of job destruction in the manufacturing sector is due solely to establishment “deaths”
[Davis and Haltiwanger 1992]. The rate appears to be higher in other sectors of the economy [Pivetz, Searson, and Spletzer 2001]
18Table II provides the details of these ﬁndings. The ﬁfth row reports that employers where the union
wins produce roughly 35 percent less in sales compared to cases where the union lost. Row (6) in Table
II also shows that the outcome of the representation election is highly correlated with our proxy for union
presence. This computation is made among the restricted sample of surviving (as of 2001) establishments.
Among “union-loss” establishments we observe a contract expiring a approximately 10 percent of the time.
When the union wins the election, on the other hand, there is a 36 percent chance that we will observe a
union contract ending after the election.
The rest of Table II provides good reason for the analyst to resist interpreting the union-won/loss
differences in rows (1) - (5) as causal effects of union certiﬁcation. For example, the establishments where
the union won are about 15 to 20 percent smaller than the “union-loss” establishments, as measured by
the number of eligible voters or the ultimate number of votes cast in the NLRB election. In light of these
differences, it is thus not surprising that we observe differences in employment after the election, in the
same direction, and of roughly the same magnitude.
Similarly, row (7) of Table II reveals that we are more likely to detect the presence of a union
before the election among establishments where the union won recognition compared to employers where
the union lost: the respective proportions of pre-election “union presence” are 0.179 and 0.095.
In addition, employers differ by election outcomes on a number of other dimensions; these differ-
ences give more reason to maintain some doubt in any causal interpretation of the comparisons in rows (1)
- (5) of Table II. For example, as row (12) of Table II indicates, establishments where the union won the
election are much less likely (33 versus 42 percent) to be classiﬁed in the manufacturing sector. Moreover,
as rows (13) and (14) of Table II indicate, establishments where the union won are more likely to be in
the service sector (35 percent in “union-win” establishments versus 22 percent for “union-loss” establish-
m e n t s )a n dt h ev o t i n gu n i tl e s sl i k e l yt ob ec l a s s i ﬁed by the NLRB as “truck drivers”. On the other hand,
measures of state economic conditions are not strongly related to the outcome of the election. The union
won/loss differences in the levels and changes in the unemployment rate and the log(employment) level are
statistically but not economically signiﬁcant.
19In sum, Table II provides evidence that caution the analyst against making inferences about the
impacts of union certiﬁcation on employer outcomes from simple differences in outcomes by election out-
come.25 The evidence is suggestive that union recognition by election may be negatively selected – that
unions are more likely to prevail in a representation election in smaller, and potentiallyless robust establish-
ments. This would be consistent with the notion that larger establishments with greater resources may be
more able to resist organizing drives. However, this interpretation of Table II is at best speculative without
an independent estimate of the causal effect of union certiﬁcation.
5 Estimates of the Impact of Unionization
5.1 Evidence on Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
As mentioned above, if the regression discontinuity design is valid, employers involved in close union wins
should be similar, on average, to those involved in close union losses, in terms of their pre-determined
characteristics – whether or not they are observed by the econometrician. As in any empirical analysis,
assessing whether “unobservables” are balanced is impossible. However, we can at least assess whether or
notthe regression discontinuity design is succeeding in balancingobservable determinants of establishment
survival. Our empirical analysis reveals that the examination of close elections does result in “treatment”
and “control” establishments that appear to be otherwise similar on observable dimensions.
Table III reports differences in characteristics of the employer, by union victory/loss, in the overall
sample, and by sub-samples that isolate closer and closer elections. For example, in elections where the
union lost, the average number of eligible voters is about 113, compared to about 92 where the union
eventually won. That difference remains large when we examine elections where the union won between
25 and 75 percent of that vote. But it drops in half when we focus on the comparison among elections
where the union won between 35 and 65 percent of the vote. The same holds true in percentage terms. The
difference in terms of the log of the vote cast falls from -0.19 to about -0.10 when we move from the ﬁrst
25 The researcher might be tempted to conduct the analysis conditional on the pre-determined characteristics such as industry,
and size of voting unit, under the presumption that the election outcome is random conditional on those covariates. Besides being
somehwat adhoc, by“usingup” the covariates, this approachhas the drawbackof eliminatinganypossibility of gaugingthe internal
validity of the comparison.
20to third set of columns.
The differences in these average characteristics become even smaller when we focus our attention
on all elections where the share of the vote for the union is between 0.45 and 0.50. For twenty-person
votes, this means the outcome was decided by one vote. Table III shows that, for example, the differences
in the pre-election size of the employer (as measured by the number of eligible voters and votes cast) fall
t o2o r3( o nb a s e so fm o r et h a n1 0 0 ) .E m p l o y e r si n v o l v e di nu n i o nl o s s e sa r em o r el i k e l yt ob ec l a s s i ﬁed
as manufacturing establishments in the overall sample (ﬁrst set of columns), but that difference falls to a
statistically insigniﬁcant -.025 when examining elections decided by the narrowest margin (the fourth set of
columns). The monotonically decreasing differences, as one compares closer and closer elections, is also
true for the proportion of employers categorized as service sector establishments, and for the proportion of
voting units classiﬁed by the NLRB as “trucking”.
Table III also shows that as one examines closer elections, the estimated standard errors rise, which
would be expected, since the number of observations used for the analysis necessarily declines. At some
point, restricting the sample to even closer elections will result in no observations for analysis. This il-
lustrates the well-known trade-off between bias and variance in non-parametric estimation of an unknown
conditional expectation function. Indeed, the averages in the last set of columns can be interpreted as kernel
regression estimates using a uniform kernel of bandwidth 0.05. Insofar as the slope of the true conditional
expectation function (of the variables with respect to the vote share) is nonzero, any kernel regression
estimate will necessarily be biased in ﬁnite samples.
A simple alternative way of using data points away from the 0.50 threshold to estimate population
means at the threshold, is to specify a ﬂexible-form parametrization of the underlying function. Figures
IIa, b, and c illustrate the results from regressing the corresponding dependent variables on a fourth-order
polynomial in the vote share, including a dummy variable Vj > 0.50, and the dummy variable interacted
with a linear term in Vj. The predicted values of those regressions are super-imposed upon local averages
by 0.05 intervals.
Figure IIa, IIb, and IIc reveal 1) that the predicted values from the polynomial come reasonably
21close to the local averages, 2) there is a generally smooth empirical relation between, for example log(total
votes cast), the probability that the employer is a manufacturing or service sector establishment, and the
observed vote share, and 3), there is no striking discontinuity in any of these relations at the 0.50 threshold.
Overall, Table III and Figures IIa-c lend credence to the interpretation of any discontinuity in post-
election outcomes as the causal effect of union recognition.
5.2 Effects on Survival Rates
The survival rate differences between union victories and losses, by the margin of victory/loss, are reported
in the ﬁrst row of Table III. It shows that the modest difference in survival probabilities in the overallsample
falls to a point estimate of -0.023 in the second set of columns. It falls further to -0.014 in the third set of
columns, and when the sample is restricted to elections where the union vote share is between 0.45 and
0.55, the difference becomes a statistically insigniﬁcant, -0.007 with a estimated standard error of 0.015.
Given the magnitude of the standard error, the estimate is consistent with both a negative effect of up to
-.037, as well as a positive impact of up to 0.023 at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
Similar to Figures IIa-c, Figure Ia reveals a relatively smooth relation between the fraction of sur-
viving employers and the vote share for the union, with no apparent discontinuity at the 0.50 threshold.
Again, the polynomial speciﬁcation (the same speciﬁcation used in Figures IIa-c) yields predicted values
that closely track the local averages by vote share. The polynomial speciﬁcation also yields a causal esti-
mate of around -0.007 with a standard error of 0.014.
Robustness to Alternative Speciﬁcations Our causal estimates of the impact of unionization of em-
ployer survival are robust to a variety of different speciﬁcations. The robustness of the estimates to varying
speciﬁcations is in fact an implication of a valid regression discontinuity design. Intuitively, if examining
close elections generates “as good as randomized” variation in union status, then not only should union
status be independent of pre-determined “baseline” characteristics (Table III), but the inclusion of those
characteristics as covariates in a regression analysis should not signiﬁcantly alter the point estimates of
the effect of certiﬁcation.
22Table IV provides evidence that the estimates are indeed robust to various speciﬁcations. The
estimate that results from the basic polynomial speciﬁcation (depicted in Figure Ia) is reported in Column
(1) (top panel) of Table IV. The ﬁrst row of Table IV demonstrates that the estimate of the impact of
union recognition on survival probabilities is robust to the inclusion of any combination of pre-determined
characteristics, with the estimates ranging from -0.003 to -0.007. In Column (2), a set of election-year
dummy variables is included. In Column(3) state dummies are additionally included, and in Column (4)
industry dummies and unit dummies (indicating how the NLRB classiﬁed the primary type of worker in
the bargaining unit) are included. In Columns (5) and (6) our proxy for the presence of a union before the
election is included (since it is pre-determined as of the election date), as is the log of the number of eligible
voters in the bargaining unit. It is important to note that the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the pre-election union
presence dummy should not be interpreted as a causal effect, but simply indicative that this proxy appears
to absorb some of the “residual” variance in the dependent variable.
We consider one ﬁnal robustness check. If the regression discontinuity design is valid, we can
replace the survival indicator with a “residualized" version of the indicator (the residuals from a regression
of the survival indicator on all the covariates) and ﬁnd a similar estimate. Indeed, when we use the resulting
residuals as the dependent variable in a polynomial speciﬁcation in the vote share (as in Column (1)),
Column (7) shows that the estimate is -0.007 – nearly identical to the other estimates in the ﬁrst row.
Estimates of Heterogeneous Effects We next examine the extent to which the “treatment” effect of
unionization, as discussed above, varies along three potentially important ways. By analogy to Ordinary
Least Squares with a binary treament variable and other covariates, we examine whether there any interest-
ing “interactions” between the treatment and other exogenous covariates. As the results from Table V make
clear, however, the data cannot reject the hypothesis that the estimated “treatment” effect of unionization,
as presented above, are constant along the three dimensions we explore.
First, since we observe survival at one point in time (the year 2001), the “overall” estimate we
obtained is an average of 2- through 18-year survival rates. Since a positive effect on survival in the short-
23run could be canceling out a long-run negative effect (or vice versa), it is instructive to stratify the analysis
by groups of years. The 2nd row of the ﬁrst column presents the estimate from Column (6) of Table IV.
The 3rd row reports that among elections that were held before 1988, the corresponding effect of union
recognition on the probability of survival is about -0.022 with a standard error of 0.020. The following
three rows report the interaction effects for the periods 1988-1991, 1992-1995, and after 1995, respectively.
The interactions effects are small and statistically insigniﬁcant.26
Second, the effect could potentially vary signiﬁcantly by industry. The next three rows in the ﬁrst
column of Table V show that the effects are slightly larger for service sector establishments, but again the
interactions are not jointly statistically signiﬁcant. Third, the effects could vary by the size of the voting
unit (a rough proxy for initial size of the establishment). The ﬁnal three rows of Table V show that the
estimates are positive (0.005) for voting unit sizes between 20 and 40 workers, and are slightly negative
(0.005-0.032=-0.027) for units between 40 and 100. But all interactions are not statistically meaningful at
conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
The second column reports that the estimates of the overall effect and the various interactions do
not change signiﬁcantly, when we use an alternative measure of establishment survival. As mentioned in
Section 4, we consider that an establishment has survived as of 2001 if the company name and address
matches an entry in the InfoUSA database. However, in principle, if bare losers are much more likely than
bare winners to undergo an ownership change – and hence change their name – then our primary measure
of establishment survival may mask a true effect on establishment closure. A comparatively robust way to
address this issue is to consider that an establishment has survived if any establishment is present at that
exact address as ofthe year 2001 – irrespective of whether the company name changes. The second column
of Table V reports the estimates from using this measure (Survival (2)), and shows that the estimates mirror
that of the ﬁrst column.27
On balance, while we cannot rule out small heterogeneous effects by these three observable di-
26 Speciﬁcally, the speciﬁcation was the same as Column (6), except year dummies were replaced with time-period dummies,
their interactions with the WINj indicator and their interactions with Vt.
27 Apparent from the ﬁrst row, the obvious exception, as expected, is that the proportion of establishments that have any business
(regardless of name) as of the year 2001, is signiﬁcantly higher, at about 0.643.
24mensions due to the magnitudes of the sampling errors, we interpret the estimates as indicating that our
main estimate is not being wholly driven by a particular sub-sample, as deﬁned along these observable
dimensions.
5.3 Further Evidence on the Consequences of Union Recognition
It is tempting to conjecture that a union that barely wins a representation election possesses the same degree
of “bargaining power” as a union that barely lost. After all, even if the NLRA mandates that the employer
bargain “in good faith” with the union as the exclusive representative of the workers in the unit, there is no
guarantee that a ﬁrst contract will be secured. Also, since nothing prevents a losing union from attempting
another organizing drive (as long as one year has passed since the ﬁrst election), one might conjecture that
the outcome of a close election may in the long-run have no effect on the extent of union presence or power
at the employer.
As we discuss in greater detail in Section 6, this conjecture is difﬁcult to reconcile with the simple
economic framework we have outlined above. Among other reasons, it is difﬁcult to explain why a union
would undergo a costly organizing campaign if the outcome of the election was inconsequential for the
union.
More importantly, this conjecture is strongly inconsistent with our analysis of the data we have
collected on post-election union presence. Speciﬁcally, while we do not directly observe the securing of
a ﬁrst contract, we observe the expiration of a ﬁrst contract (and expirations of subsequent contracts).
Thus, our post-election “union presence” variable is whether or not we observe at the employer’s location
an FMCS contract expiration notice subsequent to the date of the election. The second to last row of
Table III shows that there is a large difference in the probability of observing an expiration notice between
union victories and losses. That difference becomes smaller, when examining closer elections, but remains
a highly statistically signiﬁcant 0.159 when examining elections with a union vote share between 0.45
and 0.55. In fact, our post-election “union presence” variable is the only variable in Table III where the
differences remain large when examining the closest of elections.
25The behavior of our post-election “union presence” proxy also stands out in our graphical analysis
of the data. Figure Ib shows a smooth empirical relation between the vote share and the probability of
observing a contract expiration notice – everywhere except at the 0.50 threshold, where there is a sharp
jump in that probability from about 0.12 to 0.28. By contrast, the last row of Table III and Figure Ic,
suggest no corresponding striking change for our pre-election “union presence” variable (an indicator of
whether we observe a contract expiration notice at the address of the employer before the election). These
ﬁgures suggest that the outcome of the representation election is far from inconsequential – that there is a
permanent causal effect of a union victory on this particular proxy of union power. Also, the effect on our
post-election union presence proxy is robust to alternative speciﬁcations, as shown in Table IV. This would
be expected if the assumptions of the regression discontinuity design were valid. The estimates of the effect
of union recognition on the probability that we observe a contract expiration notice at the establishment are
precisely estimated and range from 0.132 to 0.152. Note from the comparison of Columns (3) and (5) or (4)
and (6) that the inclusion of the pre-election union proxy does not meaningfully affect the union recognition
effect, despite its own independent predictive power (t-statistic over 20).28
Some care needs to be taken in interpreting these ﬁndingsinTableIIIandFiguresIbandIc, because
the averages are computed using the sample of establishments that have survived as of the year 2001. In
principle, this induces a censored sample selection problem. In the same way that wages are not observed
for the non-employed, our post-election union presence variable – and any other measure of union presence
–i sd e ﬁned only for those surviving establishments29, there is therefore the potential that the discontinuity
in Figure Ib is an artifact of sample selection bias [Heckman 1976].
However, in this particular context, the sample selection bias problem may not be important after
all. Lee [2002] shows that if a treatment is “as good as randomized”, and if treatment affects sample selec-
tion in a monotonic way, then equal probabilities of selection in the treatment and control group imply that
there is no sample selection bias. These two conditions are applicable here: 1) the maintained hypothesis
28 Again, the coefﬁcient on the pre-election union presence variable is not to be interpreted as a causal effect; rather it is more
properly thought of as a partial correlation; its inclusion “absorbs” residual variation.
29 Actually, we do have some information for those that are not in business as of the year 2001, but we do not know when, between
the date of the election and 2001, the establishment shut down.
26is that the regression discontinuity design generates “as good as randomized” variation in the union status
treatment, and the data fail to reject the restrictions implied by that hypothesis, and 2) Equations 1 and 5
both satisfy the monotonicity condition in Lee [2002]. Given that we estimate little or no effect of union
recognition on survival (here, sample selection), this suggests that there is little or no sample selection bias
in our causal estimate of the effect of union recognition on post-election union presence.
Furthermore, Lee [2002] shows that if the selection probabilities are the same, the independence
and monotonicity conditions imply that the selected sample of treated and control populations should pos-
sess similar distributions of baseline (or pre-determined) characteristics. Such a pattern is apparent in these
data, as shown in Appendix Table III, which is analogous to Table III, except that it restricts the sample to
establishments that have survived as of the year 2001.30
Finally, since the evidence suggests that sample selection bias may not be important, we proceed
by examining union impacts on four other measures of employer outcomes: the levels of employment and
estimated sales volume, as well as the logs of both variables. Table V reports regression discontinuity
estimates for these outcomes. Overall, the results are mixed; the employment and sales responses are small
relative to the overall variability in outcomes across establishments. However, the estimated standard errors
are too large to rule out economically meaningful negative or positive effects on employment.
The third column reports regression discontinuity estimates for the level of employment, where
we have assigned “0” to those establishments that have closed by the year 2001. The point estimate is
essentially 0 with a standard error of 8. While the null hypothesis of a zero effect cannot be rejected
at conventional levels of signiﬁcance, neither can a negative response of about 13 employees – about 15
percent of the mean (83.4).
The ﬁfth column reports the estimates for estimated sales volume, where again we have assigned
“0” to establishments no longer in existence. The estimates imply a positive impact on sales volume on
the order of $250,000 dollars, but it is not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, a substantial
30 Technically, it also conditions on having non-missing employment information. There are some suriving establishments that
did not report employment levels.
27negative effect (of about $2.6 million, about 20 percent of the mean) could not be ruled out at conventional
levels of signiﬁcance. As with employment, the cross-sectional variability in sales is quite signiﬁcant, and
suggests that even large, economically meaningful effects on sales are small, relative to the cross-sectional
heterogeneity in output across establishments, even while including industry dummies.
Thefourth and sixth columnsreport the discontinuity estimates forthelog ofemploymentandsales
volume, respectively; hence, “dead” or “0 employment” establishments are necessarily dropped from the
sample. The null hypothesis that the effects are zero cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signiﬁ-
cance, but the estimated standard errors are themselves of economically signiﬁcant magnitudes. Nonethe-
less, we are able to statistically rule out large effects: for example, a 25 percent negative effect on employ-
ment and a 20 percent positive effect on sales volume.
6 Economic Implications
We believe that our estimates constitute an important step in empirically assessing the magnitude
of economic distortions caused by unions. Considering it as a ﬁrst step to providing a broader picture of
the causal effects of unions (while adequately considering the potential biases induced by self-selection and
omitted variables), we are hesitant to draw strong inferences regarding the magnitude of potential welfare
losses. However, it is instructive to consider our ﬁndings’ implications in light of ﬁve issues of economic
interpretation.
6.1 Is the “treatment” small?
An alternative explanation of the lack of effects on survival rates is that the wage demands by unions, on
average, are themselves small – too small to have a measurable impact on employer survival rates. It is
tempting to conjecture that even though a union election win causes greater union presence (as measured
by the existence of a contract), a union that barely wins an election cannot negotiate wages any larger than
what would have been offered by the management had the union barely lost.
However, the notion that the gap between the union and management offered wage is small among
close elections, and large among votes where the union happens to overwhelming win, is not a robust
28prediction of our framework of optimizing employers and unions. Within our framework, it is possible to
generatespeciﬁc examples where such a prediction would hold, given speciﬁcassumptionsabout the shapes
of the objective functions for the employer and union, the shape of v(·), and the distribution of −Uj.O nt h e
other hand, it is just as easy to generate the opposite prediction – that the gap in the wage offers WU
j −WN
j
declines with an exogenous increase in the probability of a union victory.
To see this, suppose that δj is a parameter that characterizes how much the workers care about
wages so that we have v
³
WU
j ,WN
j ,δj
´
where ∂v
∂δj > 0. Now suppose that the union leadership has a
limited range of credible wage offers; to make the example stark, suppose that it is (correctly) expected
by all agents that if the union wins, the wage WU
j will be ﬁxed at WU
j . In this case, the equilibrium is
determined solely by the management’s counter-offer wage. One can show that there are some reasonable
assumptions under which
∂W N∗
j
∂δj > 0 and
∂ Pr[WIN j=1]
∂δj , which would imply that the wage gap WU∗
j − WN∗
j
diminishes with an exogenous increase in the probability that the union will win.31 Intuitively, faced with
an exogenous increase in wage demands on the part of the workers (increase in δj), fearing the prospect
of paying the high union wage, management offers a larger non-union wage in order to reduce the chance
of losing the election to the union. In equilibrium, the probability of a union victory does increase, but
it is moderated by the management’s optimal response. Therefore, in this case, we would expect to see a
larger wage difference among close elections (where the probability of a union victory is more moderate)
compared to elections in which the union overwhelmingly won (in which the probability was higher).
There is another reason to expect that WU∗
j − WN∗
j may even be larger with a lower probability
of the union winning: a union requires a larger minimum gain WU∗
j − WN∗
j in order to justify a costly
31 Let v
¡
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U
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N
j + δj.T h e n t h e ﬁrst-order conditions for the employer amounts to the equation
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∂WN
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¡
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N
j
¢
=0 ,w h e r ef (·) and F (·) are the density and cdf for −Uj.T h eﬁrst term
can be interpreted as the marginal beneﬁt from raising the offered wage, which reduces the probability that the union will win,
and the second term can be though of as the marginal costs (due to lower proﬁts). An interior solution is guaranteed if
f(v)
1−F(v)
and
∂π(WN
j )
∂WN
j
π(WU
j )−π(WN
j ) are decreasing and increasing, respectively, in W
N
j . This will be true if −Uj is normally distributed and
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j ). By the implicit function theorem
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which will be positive but less than 1.
Therefore, an increase in δj leads to an increase in the offered wage W
N
j and in the equilibrium probability that the union will win.
29organizing drive. This is immediately apparent from Equation 11, which shows that the expected beneﬁt
– itself a product of the probability and the beneﬁt function U (·) – needs to exceed c to justify having an
election in the ﬁrst place. Put simply, the lower probability that the union will prevail, the larger wage gain
is needed to justify the costs of organizing.
For these reasons, it seems more plausible that the outcome of the election is far from inconse-
quential to both the employer and the union, perhaps especially among close elections (where the ex ante
probabilities of a union win are more moderate). However, whether or not the outcome of a representation
election has any measurable impact on compensation and working conditions is ultimately an empirical
question. Future research could show that the outcomes of elections are inconsequential in terms of alter-
ing compensation and working conditions, which would suggest that the conventional wisdom regarding
how unions affect wages would need to be re-evaluated.
6.2 Is the effect “economically” small?
Our analysis obtains estimates around -0.01, and the null hypothesis of “no effect” cannot be rejected at
conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance. However, it is also instructive to consider whether or not the
estimates are consistent with an alternative null hypothesis – that the decline in the union sector in the U.S.
in recent years is entirely attributable to the union impact on employer survival.
Such “back-of-the-envelope” calculations require a great deal of abstraction. However, suppose
we consider an economy initially made up of N0 establishments with identical, constant hazard rate of
closure of d per year, and a constant inﬂow of bN0 establishments per year. Normalizing N0 =1 ,i ti s
straightforward to show that the number of establishments at time t is represented by
n(t)=λ +( 1− λ)e−dt (12)
where λ = b
d,s ot h a ti fb = d, the number of establishments remains constant over time.32
Over the period from 1983 to 1998, union density among private sector workers fell by approx-
imately 40 percent. The implied baseline hazard rate from our data of establishments implies a constant
32 This follows from a the differential equation n
0 (t)=dn(t)+b.
30hazard of d =0 .10.33 This implies λ =
¡
0.6 − e−0.10(15)¢ 1
1−e−0.10(15) =0 .485. Thus, if the decline of
the union sector was entirely due to the union effect on the ability of establishments to survive (i.e. if the
establishments were not unionized, λ would be 1), then the causal effect of union recognition would have
to be a doubling of the hazard rate d. With a base hazard rate of 0.10, this implies that we should expect
causal estimates of the 1-15 year survival rates to be on the order of -0.20.34 To the contrary, however, our
causal estimates are around -0.01 and we are able to reject magnitudes larger than -0.04.
Thus, our estimates cast considerable doubt on the proposition that the primary mechanism of re-
cent union decline is through union effects on establishment closure. Of course, these rough calculations
s h o u l db ev i e w e dw i t hc a u t i o n ,a st h e ya r eb a s e do nan u m b e ro fc o m p o s i t i o n a l ,a g g r e g a t i o n ,a n db e h a v -
ioral assumptions – the empirical relevance of which can only be assessed with large-scale micro-data on
establishments in the U.S.
6.3 The Impacts of Union Threat
Our estimates of the impacts of unionization are conditional on having an NLRB election, and our model
makes it clear that we are identifying the impacts of WU
j − WN
j on survival rates. As our model makes
explicit, however, there is another potential impact of unions, which is the distortion due to “union threat”
[Rosen 1969]. In other words, employers may face a higher closure rate because their own offered wage
WN
j is forced to be signiﬁcantly higher than the competitive market wage WM
j . There are two components
to the “overall” impacts of unionization: one component is the effect that arises when wages are pushed
from WM
j to WN
j , and the other component – which we have estimated in this paper – results when wages
are increased from WN
j to WU
j .S i n c ew eﬁnd little evidence of effects on survival of the second kind, we
conclude that evidence of large union effects on closure would more likely be found in analyses of union
threat effects.
However, our theoretical framework cautions against making the conjecture that threat effects
33 Actually, our data seem to ﬁt a Weibull baseline better; however, as usual, it is difﬁcult to know whether the empirical duration
dependence is “real” or an artifact of unobserved heterogeneity. The 10 percent hazard rate is also roughly consistent with exit rate
estimates from Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson [1989] and McGuckin, Nguyen, and Reznek [1998].
34 This can be seen by comparing the survivor function e
−.1t and e
−.2t over a 15-period interval.
31should necessarily be larger than the union effects that we have estimated in this analysis. To see this,
suppose that the ﬁrm will survive only if y∗
j in Equation 4 exceeds some scalar a. Then the probability of
closure is Pr[Closure]=F (a − αWj),w h e r eF (·) is the cdf of εj.
dPr[Closure]
dWj = −f (a − αWj)α and
d2 Pr[Closure]
dW 2
j = f0 (a − π(Wj))α2; the sign of the second derivative depends on the shape of the distribu-
tion of the error term, and can easily be positive, which would mean that a marginal impact on closure rises
with the wage. Thus, a wage increase that results from a union victory, which is incremental on top of an
already existing above-market wage due to union threat – could easily lead to a larger effect on closure,
compared to the effect induced by an equally sized wage gain due to union threat.
Ultimately, the magnitude of the union threat effect requires empirical investigation.
6.4 Is “no effect” in survival rates consistent with monopoly unionism?
Put simply, yes. There are many margins on which unions could cause allocative distortions. First, even
if employers’ probabilities of closure are entirely unaffected, they could cut their level of employment.
This could be occurring within every establishment in the union sector. Second, even if employment is not
affected, if the employer’s production techniques are constrained by the terms of a contract or union threat,
productivity and hence output could fall.
It is instructive to consdier a benchmark for what one might expect to observe in the analogous case
where adjustments occur primarily through the “intensive” margin of employment. Interpret λ =
(1−∆)b
d =
1 − ∆ in terms of the proportion of total employees at an establishment, so that ∆ is now the “within-
employer” response. If we assume that the inﬂow of new establishments equals the hazard rate, under the
null hypothesis that the sole reason for the union decline was due to an intensive margin effect, we would
expect the measured causal impact of union certiﬁcation on employment to be about a 50 percent decline
in the level of employment at the establishment. 35 Even given the imprecision of our intensive margin
estimates, however, we can easily reject an effect of such magnitude. On the other hand, we cannot rule
out a smaller negative intensive margin employment effect of unionization of, say, 15 percent. Given the
35 Alternatively, if the effects were on the margin of affecting the appearance of establishments in the union sector, it is easy to
show that if it entirely explained recent union decline in the U.S., the effect would be a quite large effect of 0.50 in probability.
32often cited estimate of the union wage effect of 15 percent [Lewis, 1963] this would imply a labor demand
elasticity of -1.
The magnitude of intensive margin effects is a topic for future research. But examining the exten-
sive margin is a pre-requisite to examining the intensive margin. Even in the ideal scenario (from a purely
scientiﬁc standpoint) where union recognition were randomly assigned, it would not be straightforward to
estimate intensive margin effects on employment if the “treated” employers were more likely to “die” and
hence “drop out of the sample”. Our ﬁndings that there are negligible survival effects and that among the
survivors both the bare winners and losers look similar along observable characteristics; this suggests that
the sample selection issue may well be a second order issue.
6.5 Is “no effect” unsurprising?
Finally, it may be tempting to argue on purely theoretical grounds that the question of whether or not union
recognition impacts employer survival is a non-issue in the ﬁrst place, if we assume that workers and unions
are rational. After all, unionized workers also lose if an employer is forced to close its operations.36 This
is certainly true in the unrealistic case that unionization led to closure with complete certainty. But if the
union effect works through a negative impact on the probability of survival, a large effect (say a doubling
of a hazard rate of 0.10) could easily be consistent with rationally behaving workers and unions.37 Thus,
arguments purely based on the presumed rationality of workers are not informative in bounding the union
effects on employer survival.
Nonetheless, the notion that the organizing workers and union leadership may be behaving ratio-
nally – and have a direct stake in maximizing the viability of the employer – has important implications.
Indeed, not only could the union be interested in reducing the risk of closure, but they could be interested
36 This is pointed out in Kuhn [1986] and Freeman and Kleiner [1999].
37 If the worker’s outside option is equivalent to the ﬁrm’s non-union wage offer, then it is trivial that any worker will prefer to
vote for the union, even if there are substantial effects of the wage on closure rates, as long as there is some probability that the
establishment will still exist so that they can obtain the union wage.
If the worker’s outside option is below the ﬁrm’s offered wage, then for the indifferent worker (under risk neutrality) we would
have
WN−WM
1−δ(1−d) =
Wu−WM
1−δ(1−2d),w h e r eWU, WN,a n dWM denote the union, ﬁrm’s non-union wage offer, and outside options,
respectively, and δ is the discount factor, and d is the constant hazard rate for the establishment. If WU − WN were 0.10 in logs
and δ was 0.95, and d were 0.10,t h e nWN − WM would have to be about 0.06 (in logs) – a plausible number – in order for the
worker to be indifferent.
33in maximizing the proﬁtability of the business – insofar as it would lead, for example, to a larger wage
bill for the workers. Indeed, this possibility has been the focus of the “efﬁcient contracts” literature (Mc-
Donald and Solow (1981), Brown and Ashenfelter (1986), MacCurdy and Pencavel (1986), Card (1986),
Abowd (1989), Abowd and Lemieux (1993)). The efﬁcient contracts model departs conceptually from the
monopoly union/“right–to–manage” model by observing that union members could value both the level of
employment and the wage. And if the ﬁrm enjoys some economic rents – through monopoly power in the
product market, for example – the monopoly union outcome is “inefﬁcient” in the sense that at least one
of the two parties can be made better off without making the other party worse off. In some situations –
when there is a “strongly efﬁcient” contract – there is a possibility that unions do not lower employment,
but instead act to redistribute rents from ﬁrms to workers.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This study meets two important challenges of credibly estimating the magnitude of the causal ef-
fects of unions. First, we have constructed a large data set that represents a virtual universe of estab-
lishments facing potential unionization, linked to comprehensive database on survivorship on businesses.
Using over 27,000 observations, we have also exploited a feature of the NLRB election process to produce
quasi-experimental estimates that are likely to be free of selection and omitted variable biases. Our results
suggest that establishment closure is not the main mechanism of the employment reallocation response to
unionization. Rather, it seems more likely that employers respond by reducing employment.
In the existing literature, there is a fair amount of variation in estimates of “within-ﬁrm” employ-
ment responses to unionization.38 I tw o u l ds e e mf r u i t f u lt ou t i l i z et h i ss t u d y ’ sr e s e a r c hd e s i g nt ol e a r nm o r e
about this margin of employment adjustment. There is also some uncertainty regarding the labor costs im-
posed by unions. The existing literature suggests that union wage premiums are large, and that unions have
38 Estimates range from no effect to signﬁcant effects. For example, Lalonde, Marschke and Troske [1996] suggest there is
signiﬁcant negative employment response. Card [1990] examines indexed and non-index union contracts and ﬁnds a signiﬁcant
negative employment response to higher real wages. On the other hand, Bronars and Deere [1993] examine a panel of publically-
traded ﬁrms and ﬁnds no systematic relation between union growth and ﬁrm growth. Freeman and Kleiner [1990] ﬁnd only modest
employment effects (and modest wage effects) associated with new unionization.
34signiﬁcant effects on proﬁtability [Ruback and Zimmerman 1984; Abowd 1989]. At the same time there is
some evidence indicating only modest wage gains associated with new unionization [Freeman and Kleiner
1990; Lalonde, Marschke, and Troske 1996]. A useful avenue for future research is to use NLRB election
data, as we have here, to explore the impact of unionization on: the level and distribution of wages, capital
investment, and total factor productivity.
35Appendix A.
There are three sources of information that were merged for the analysis. We ﬁrst describe how our data
from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was matched to ﬁrm data from InfoUSA. Next we de-
scribe how the result of this matching process, henceforth the “NLRB/InfoUSA data” was matched to data
from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS).
A.1 The NLRB to InfoUSA match
First, electronic records on all representation election cases handled by the NLRB in the ﬁscal years 1984
to 1999 were obtained. These records contain information such as the dates of the ﬁling of the petition, the
election, and the closing of the case, as well as the eventual vote tallies, as well as other characteristics such
as the size of the voting unit, and the primary industry of the establishment in question. Most importantly
the ﬁle contains information on the name and street address at which the representation election was held.
These139,881recordswerethenmatchedbynameandaddresstoacommercialmarketingdatabase
company called InfoUSA, Inc. Before being sent to InfoUSA, however, the address ﬁelds were ﬁrst “stan-
dardized" using a program called “Mailers +4 Postal Automation Software." For example, “1 Broad Street"
was changed to “1 BROAD ST". This was done to facilitate matching the NLRB data to the data from In-
foUSA.
As discussed in the text, InfoUSA maintains an annually updated list of all business establishments
(with a telephone listing) in the United States. The basis for their database is the consolidation of virtually
all telephone books in the country. InfoUSA makes a brief call to each establishment at least once a year,
to verify their existence, and to update their information on various items such as 1) the total number of
employees at the establishment, 2) the estimated sales volume of the establishment, 3) the primary product
of the business, and various other characteristics.
We submitted the name and address information from our “address standardized" NLRB data to
InfoUSA who matched as many of the submitted records to their current database (as of May, 2001) and
then appended their information to the record. Apart from the name and address information, no other
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Before merging this data to our data from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (de-
scribed below) the data were cleaned for duplicates. There were three types of duplicates: 1) genuine
duplicates – more than one NLRB case with a speciﬁc employer, 2) duplicates which where an artifact of
the fact that our NLRB data came in two ﬁles: one contained data from 1977 to 1991 and the other con-
tained the records for 1984-1999. Most of the duplicate pairs therefore occurred for the years 1984–1991,
although their were some duplicate pairs in other years because of the ﬁscal/calendar year distinction; 3) a
very small number of duplicates where two records containing exactly the same information.
A.2 The NLRB/InfoUSA to FMCS match
The most difﬁcult task was to take this NLRB and InfoUSA matched data and merge it to a database of
563,565 expiration notices between 1984 and February, 2001 obtained from the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. Like the NLRB data
the addresses were standardized using “Mailers +4 Postal Automation Software.”
Many of the FMCS address could not be standardized. Reasons included:
• The ZIP Code was invalid or does not match the city name.
• Canadian ZIP Code
• Unknown Street. No street could be found within the city that matches the street name given in the
address ﬁeld.
• Non-delivery Address. The location given in the address ﬁe l dp h y s i c a l l ye x i s t si nt h ec i t yb u tt h ep o s t
ofﬁce has indicated that there are no houses there. This may occur when one side of the street has
railroad tracks or a river along side it.
• Address Out of Range. The address was not within the delivery range.
• Multiple Addresses. The national database found two or more possible ranges for the address.
• Multiple Components. More than one component of your address was in error. Address components are
the pre-direction, post-direction, and sufﬁx.
• No Data Available for City. Address data for this city is not in the database.
We chose to keep all FMCS records that had successfully standardized addresses, and ran an auto-
matic matching algorithm to link NLRB/InfoUSA records to the resulting database. The matching involved
matching by address and employer name. Our algorithm ﬁrst involved removing spaces, punctuation, and
37frequently used words in company names (i.e., INCORPORATED, BROTHER, COMPANY, etc.). From
this we created two separate strings of a length which we could vary: the ﬁrst sub-string started from the
beginning and the second sub-string begins from the end and went in reverse order. The longer the string,
the more “stringent” the test for two records to be declared a “match.” Matches could occur when the ﬁrst
sub-strings matched or when the second sub-strings matched.
Depending on whether the address was standardized, we varied the length of the comparison string
– when addresses were standardized then we enforced a less stringent standard than those which were
unable to be standardized. Our ﬁnal algorithm (using only the standardized data) used strings of length 5.
A.3 Sample Selection and Variable Construction
First, in order to minimize measurement error in our survival indicator, we keep only those NLRB records
that have a non-missing street address, and those addresses that were successfully standardized using our
address standardization software. In addition, we keep all elections in which 20 or more votes were cast.
Appendix Table I reports the means and standard deviations of the variables for the entire merged database
and the restricted sample used for the estimation. The table shows that the means are reasonably similar
between the two samples, except in the variables that reﬂect the scale of the employer (number of eligible
voters, votes cast, employment, sales volume).
Finally, great care was taken to construct the vote share for the union. There is a problem with
simply computing the ratio ofthe numberofvotesfor the union to the totalnumberof votes. This is because
thereissubstantialvariabilityinthenumberofvotescast, andaunionvictoryissecuredbyobtainingstrictly
more than 50 percent of the vote (plus 1 vote). Consider all elections where an even number of votes are
cast. Elections with any number of votes cast could result in exactly 50 percent of the vote. However, it is
impossible that an election with less than 100 votes cast could have a vote share between 50 and 51 percent
of the vote. This mechanically induces a discontinuity in the size distribution at the 50 percent threshold of
the vote share, and this is entirely an artifact of the fact that the vote share is not literally continuous, and
instead has ﬁnite and discrete support, with the support changing with the number of votes cast.
38Thus, we made a minor adjustment to the vote share variable in order eliminate this problem. For
every case where there was an even number of votes cast, an amount equal to 0.5/(# votes cast) was
subtracted from the vote share. For example, if 25 out of 50 votes were for the union, the vote share became
0.50 - 0.01 = .49; 26 out of 50 votes meant a vote share of 0.52 - .01 = 0.51. Cases where an odd number of
votes cast were unadjusted. This minor adjustment restores symmetry in the support for vote share, and the
new “vote share” variable still possesses the property that strictly more than 0.50 implies a union victory.
Finally, the vote share was “binned” so that all vote shares between 0.50 and 0.55 were assigned the vote
share of 0.525, shares between 0.45 and 0.50 were assigned the share of 0.475, and so forth. In this way,
vote shares were standardized to the support for the elections with the smallest number of votes cast (20).
A completely different approach is to abandon the use of the vote share completely, by focusing
on the absolute vote count, and comparing elections in which the union either won or lost by literally
1 vote. This eliminates this “integer problem”, but at the same time tends to push larger establishments
away from the threshold that determines victory (generating a pronounced U-shape in the average size
of the establishment, with respect to the absolute vote margin of victory/loss). This was the approach
used in DiNardo and Lee [2001]; it should be noted that the results reported there are qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to the results in this paper, suggesting that our ﬁndings are not sensitive to the method
used to address the integer problem.
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Figure Ia: Probability of Establishment Survival by 2001, by Vote Share
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Figure Ib: Probability of Post-Election Union Presence, by Vote Share0.00
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Figure Ic: Probability of Pre-Election Union Presence, by Vote Share3.00
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Figure IIa: Log of Total Votes Cast in NLRB Election, by Vote Share
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Local Average
Polynomial
Vote Share for Union
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
Figure IIb: Probability in Manufacturing (before Election), by Vote Share0.00
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Figure IIc: Probability in Service Sector (before Election), by Vote Share0.00
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Appendix Figure I: Estimated Density of Union Vote Share
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Vote Share for UnionTable I: Establishment Outcomes (as of 2001) by Election Outcome: NLRB Elections 1983-1999
Year of  Proportion Survived as of 2001 Mean Employment as of 2001 Mean Log of Employment as of 2001
Election All Loss Win Diff. All Loss Win Diff. All Loss Win Diff.
<=1983 0.304 0.318 0.280 -0.037 65.4 80.4 40.8 -39.5 4.35 4.55 3.99 -0.55
1984 0.277 0.294 0.255 -0.039 61.4 68.8 51.0 -17.8 4.38 4.48 4.22 -0.26
1985 0.312 0.336 0.276 -0.060 57.6 67.3 43.2 -24.1 4.35 4.39 4.27 -0.12
1986 0.309 0.333 0.275 -0.058 53.2 61.6 41.2 -20.4 4.33 4.39 4.21 -0.19
1987 0.327 0.348 0.302 -0.045 57.4 67.1 45.3 -21.9 4.39 4.51 4.22 -0.29
1988 0.360 0.372 0.343 -0.029 68.6 73.6 61.9 -11.7 4.43 4.56 4.25 -0.31
1989 0.372 0.380 0.361 -0.019 75.8 76.7 74.7 -1.9 4.40 4.52 4.24 -0.28
1990 0.393 0.395 0.390 -0.005 66.2 70.3 60.4 -9.9 4.25 4.39 4.06 -0.33
1991 0.411 0.429 0.385 -0.044 84.9 93.7 71.5 -22.3 4.37 4.46 4.23 -0.23
1992 0.432 0.450 0.409 -0.040 80.0 84.7 73.7 -11.0 4.40 4.45 4.32 -0.13
1993 0.416 0.429 0.401 -0.027 75.1 78.0 71.4 -6.5 4.37 4.50 4.18 -0.32
1994 0.465 0.458 0.474 0.016 105.4 102.5 109.3 6.7 4.53 4.61 4.43 -0.18
1995 0.509 0.521 0.491 -0.030 107.1 103.6 112.0 8.4 4.59 4.60 4.57 -0.02
1996 0.522 0.525 0.519 -0.007 107.5 105.5 110.0 4.5 4.47 4.48 4.45 -0.03
1997 0.572 0.613 0.521 -0.092 133.7 153.8 108.9 -44.8 4.57 4.67 4.41 -0.26
1998 0.572 0.578 0.565 -0.013 119.8 111.6 129.9 18.2 4.43 4.52 4.31 -0.21
1999 0.578 0.610 0.542 -0.068 115.5 134.0 94.7 -39.3 4.42 4.56 4.24 -0.32
All 0.417 0.430 0.400 -0.030 83.4 88.3 76.8 -11.5 4.42 4.51 4.30 -0.22
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (1.7) (2.2) (2.7) (3.5) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Obs. 27622 15818 11804 26355 15104 11251 10265 6092 4173
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Entries are outcomes, as of 2001, of establishments that experienced an NLRB certification election in a given year. In the middle four
columns, zero is assigned to the employment of "dead" establishments; 27622-26355=1267 establishments survived but did not report employment levels. "Loss" and "Win"
indicates the outcome of the NLRB rerpresentation election. Details of the sample selection criteria are in the Data Appendix.Table II: Means of Establishment and Election Outcomes and Characteristics, by 
Representation Election Outcome, 1983-1999
N Full Sample Union Loss Union Win Difference
1 Survival (Indicator Variable), 2001 27622 0.417 0.430 0.400 -0.030
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
2 Employment, 2001 26355 83.4 88.3 76.8 -11.5
(1.7) (2.2) (2.7) (3.5)
3 Log of Employment, 2001 10265 4.42 4.51 4.30 -0.22
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
4 Sales Volume, 2001 25719 14225 16250 11501 -4750
(321) (454) (441) (633)
5 Log of Sales Volume, 2001 9629 9.34 9.48 9.14 -0.35
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
6 Presence of Union Post-Election 11532 0.206 0.097 0.363 0.266
(Indicator Variable) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
7 Presence of Union Pre-Election 11532 0.129 0.095 0.179 0.084
(Indicator Variable) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
8 Number of Eligible Voters 27622 104.1 113.4 91.6 -21.8
(0.8) (1.2) (1.1) (1.6)
9 Log of Eligible Voters 27622 4.22 4.29 4.14 -0.15
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
10 Number of Votes Cast 27622 91.7 101.9 78.0 -23.9
(0.7) (1.0) (0.9) (1.4)
11 Log of Votes Cast 27622 4.10 4.18 3.99 -0.19
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
12 Manufacturing Sector (Indicator Variable) 27622 0.380 0.421 0.326 -0.094
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
13 Service Sector (Indicator Variable) 27622 0.273 0.218 0.348 0.130
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
14 Trucking Voting Unit (Indicator Variable) 27622 0.150 0.174 0.119 -0.055
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
15 Log of State Employment, Election Year 27622 15.08 15.06 15.10 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
16 Log of State Employment, 2000 27622 15.19 15.18 15.21 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
17 Change In Log Emp. (2000 - Election Year) 27622 0.115 0.117 0.113 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
18 State Unemployment Rate, Election Year 27622 6.23 6.24 6.22 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
19 State Unemployment Rate, 2000 27622 4.14 4.11 4.17 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
20 Change in UR (2000 - Election Year) 27622 -2.09 -2.13 -2.04 0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Details of the merged data from the NLRB, FMCS, and InfoUSA are in the Data Appendix.
Rows 2 and 4 impute 0 for non-surviving establishments (some data are missing for surviving esetablishments). Rows 6 and 7
contain only the establishments that survive to the year 2001. Presence of Union post-election (pre-election) indicates whether or
not a union at the location of the establishment filed a contract expiration between the election date and 2001 (between the
beginning of the FMCS data and the date of the election).Table III: Establishment Survival, Union Presence, and Pre-determined Characteristics, by Vote Share for the Union 
Full Sample 0.25<= Vote Share <= 0.75 0.35<= Vote Share <= 0.65 0.45<= Vote Share <= 0.55
Loss Won Diff. Loss Won Diff. Loss Won Diff. Loss Won Diff.
Survival, 2001 0.430 0.400 -0.030 0.436 0.413 -0.023 0.438 0.424 -0.014 0.442 0.435 -0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Eligible Voters 113 92 -22 120 99 -21 118 106 -12 116 114 -2
(1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (5)
Log(Elig. Voters) 4.29 4.14 -0.15 4.34 4.20 -0.14 4.33 4.25 -0.08 4.31 4.32 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Votes Cast 102 78 -24 108 87 -21 107 93 -13 105 102 -3
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4)
Log(Votes Cast) 4.18 3.99 -0.19 4.24 4.08 -0.16 4.23 4.13 -0.10 4.22 4.22 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Manufacturing 0.421 0.326 -0.094 0.437 0.363 -0.074 0.436 0.372 -0.064 0.422 0.397 -0.025
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015)
Service Sector 0.218 0.348 0.130 0.223 0.322 0.099 0.234 0.315 0.081 0.251 0.290 0.038
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014)
Trucking 0.174 0.119 -0.055 0.162 0.128 -0.034 0.148 0.125 -0.023 0.135 0.124 -0.011
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
Number of Obs. 15818 11804 11851 8112 7351 5557 2217 1923
Union Present 0.097 0.363 0.266 0.105 0.344 0.239 0.117 0.332 0.216 0.117 0.276 0.159
Post-Election (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.018)
Union Present 0.095 0.179 0.084 0.097 0.155 0.058 0.101 0.149 0.048 0.099 0.132 0.033
Pre-Election (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
Number of Obs. 6806 4726 5163 3350 3222 2358 980 836
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Entries are means and differences by election outcome, in the full and, three separate sub-samples, by election vote share. Upper panel includes 
establishments, whether or not they survive as of the year 2001, and the lower panel includes only those establishments that survive as of the year 2001."Union Present post-election" (pre-
election) indicates whether or not a union at the location of the establishment filed a contract expiration between the election date and 2001 (between the beginning of the FMCS data and 
the date of the election). Details of data set construction in the Data Appendix.Table IV: Reduced Form Specification: Effect of Union Victory on Probability of
Survival (2001), and Post-Election Presence of Union
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Probability of Survival
Union Victory -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Presence of Union --- --- --- --- 0.094 0.093 ---
(Pre-Election) --- --- --- --- (0.010) (0.010) ---
Log(Eligible Vote) --- --- --- --- 0.022 0.012 ---
--- --- --- --- (0.004) (0.004) ---
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ---
State Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ---
Industry Dummies No No No Yes No Yes ---
Unit Dummies No No No Yes No Yes ---
Probability of Post-Election Union Present
Union Victory 0.152 0.150 0.143 0.145 0.131 0.135 0.132
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Presence of Union --- --- --- --- 0.401 0.394 ---
(Pre-Election) --- --- --- --- (0.013) (0.013) ---
Log(Eligible Vote) --- --- --- --- 0.015 0.006 ---
--- --- --- --- (0.004) (0.004) ---
Year Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ---
State Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes ---
Industry Dummies No No No Yes No Yes ---
Unit Dummies No No No Yes No Yes ---
Note: N=27622 for upper panel, N=11532 (includes only those establishments that survive by 2001) for lower panel.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Upper panel refers to survival, as of 2001, as the dependent variable; lower panel
refers to the observation of a contract expiration after the election. All specifications are least squares regressions, for the
upper (lower) panel include a 4th order polynomial in the vote share, a dummy variable for win/loss and the dummy
variable interacted with the linear term in the vote share. Column (7) regresses the residuals - from an initial regresssion
of survival (presence of union) on all the covariates - on a 4th order polynomial in the vote share, a dummy variable for
win/loss and the dummy variable interacted with the linear term in the vote share. Details of the data set in the Data
Appendix.Table V: Reduced-Form Results: Impact of Certification on Establishment Outcomes,
Overall, and by Year of Election, Industry, and Voting Unit Size
Dependent Survival Survival (2) Empl. Log(Empl.) Sales Log(Sales)
Variable
Mean 0.417 0.643 83 4.42 14225 9.34
(Std. Dev) (0.493) (0.479) -276 -1.46 -51542 -1.67
Overall Effect -0.008 0.012 0 -0.07 250 -0.03
(0.013) (0.013) (8) (0.06) (1470) (0.07)
Year: before 1988 -0.022 0.009 -17 -0.18 -326 -0.10
(Main) (0.020) (0.021) (10) (0.11) (1889) (0.12)
Year: 1988-1991 0.001 0.003 13 0.17 -777 0.10
(Interaction) (0.028) (0.028) (14) (0.15) (2708) (0.16)
Year: 1992-1995 0.034 0.013 26 -0.02 2065 -0.02
(Interaction) (0.029) (0.029) (16) (0.14) (3013) (0.16)
Year: after 1995 0.022 0.003 34 0.25 1536 0.17
(Interaction) (0.029) (0.028) (17) (0.14) (3349) (0.15)
Other Industry -0.009 0.018 -2 0.06 1641 0.06
(Main) (0.021) (0.020) (9) (0.09) (2087) (0.12)
Manufacturing 0.002 -0.013 2 -0.24 -3887 -0.24
(Interaction) (0.025) (0.024) (12) (0.10) (2857) (0.13)
Service -0.016 -0.004 3 -0.07 917 0.04
(Interaction) (0.027) (0.026) (17) (0.14) (2551) (0.16)
El. Vote: < 40 0.005 0.023 -5 -0.11 2308 0.00
(0.022) (0.021) (10) (0.09) (1861) (0.12)
El. Vote: 40-100 -0.032 -0.005 -4 0.02 -1223 -0.03
(0.026) (0.025) (11) (0.11) (2040) (0.13)
El. Vote: > 100 -0.008 -0.028 30 0.06 -4318 -0.09
(0.028) (0.027) (18) (0.13) (3476) (0.16)
Number of Obs. 27622 27622 26355 10265 25719 9629
Note: Standard Deviations in first row, robust standard errors otherwise. Survival(2) denotes whether any establishment
was present at the exact street address as of 2001, third and fifth columns assign "0" to the "dead" establishments.
Estimated Annual Sales Volume is in thousands of dollars. Specifications: Base specification is Column (6) of Table IV.
See text for details on interaction specifications. See Data Appendix for details on data set constructionAppendix Table I: Summary Statistics for Merged NLRB-FMCS-InfoUSA data, full sample
and sample for estimation
All Certification Elections Sample for Estimation
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Survival (Indicator Variable), 2001 51132 0.394 0.489 27622 0.417 0.493
Survival (2) (Indicator Variable), 2001 51132 0.623 0.485 27622 0.643 0.479
Employment, 2001 48836 66 290 26355 83 276
Log of Employemt, 2001 17863 4.02 1.54 10265 4.42 1.46
Sales Volume, 2001 29367 28603 103667 16349 32865 74884
Log of Sales Volume, 2001 29367 8.68 1.83 16349 8.99 1.84
Union Present, Post-Election 51132 0.184 0.388 27622 0.175 0.380
Union Present, Pre-Election 51132 0.117 0.321 27622 0.102 0.303
Eligible Voters 51132 63 111 27622 104 135
Log(Elig. Voters) 51132 3.33 1.25 27622 4.22 0.83
Votes Cast 51132 55 98 27622 92 119
Log(Votes Cast) 51083 3.20 1.25 27622 4.10 0.82
Manufacturing 51132 0.306 0.461 27622 0.380 0.485
Service Sector 51132 0.260 0.439 27622 0.273 0.446
Trucking 51132 0.177 0.382 27622 0.150 0.357
Log(State Emp.), Year of Election 50284 15.08 0.87 27622 15.08 0.85
Log(State Emp.), Year 2000 50284 15.19 0.87 27622 15.19 0.85
Change in Log(Emp.) 50284 0.115 0.097 27622 0.115 0.096
State UR, Year of Election 50284 6.2 1.8 27622 6.2 1.8
State UR, Year 2000 50284 4.2 0.9 27622 4.1 0.8
Change in UR 50284 -2.1 1.7 27622 -2.1 1.7
Note: Sample restriction is that the number of votes cast be greater than or equal to 20, and the establishment is within the 50 U.S.
states and District of Columbia. Details of data set construction in Data AppendixAppendix Table II: NLRB Elections: Win rates and 
Average Union Vote Share, 1983 - 1999
Year of  Winning Vote Share for Union
Election Obs. Percentage Mean Std Dev.
<=1983 721 0.376 0.463 0.199
1984 1802 0.416 0.474 0.220
1985 1810 0.403 0.471 0.217
1986 1793 0.408 0.476 0.222
1987 1768 0.445 0.494 0.229
1988 1809 0.425 0.493 0.227
1989 1890 0.442 0.496 0.229
1990 1846 0.413 0.488 0.224
1991 1648 0.397 0.474 0.221
1992 1446 0.431 0.488 0.223
1993 1710 0.447 0.499 0.222
1994 1625 0.431 0.485 0.226
1995 1508 0.417 0.477 0.215
1996 1629 0.427 0.487 0.218
1997 1760 0.445 0.492 0.222
1998 1741 0.455 0.505 0.218
1999 1116 0.470 0.511 0.226
All 27622 0.427 0.487 0.222
Note: Restricted sample of elections with 20 or more valid votes cast. See
Appendix Table I.Appendix Table III: Union Presence, Pre-determined Characteristics for Surviving Establishments,
by Vote Share for the Union
Full Sample 0.25<= Vote Share <= 0.75 0.35<= Vote Share <= 0.65 0.45<= Vote Share <= 0.55
Loss Won Diff. Loss Won Diff. Loss Won Diff. Loss Won Diff.
Union Present 0.097 0.371 0.274 0.103 0.350 0.247 0.116 0.338 0.222 0.120 0.275 0.155
Post-Election (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.019)
Union Present 0.092 0.180 0.087 0.095 0.152 0.058 0.101 0.145 0.044 0.102 0.126 0.024
Pre-Election (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
Eligible Voters 120 99 -21 125 107 -18 124 114 -10 123 126 3
(2) (2) (3) (2) (3) (4) (3) (3) (5) (6) (6) (8)
Log(Elig. Voters) 4.33 4.18 -0.15 4.37 4.24 -0.13 4.35 4.29 -0.07 4.35 4.38 0.03
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.044)
Votes Cast 108 85 -23 113 94 -19 112 101 -11 110 113 3
(2) (2) (3) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (4) (5) (5) (7)
Log(Votes Cast) 4.22 4.04 -0.19 4.27 4.13 -0.15 4.26 4.18 -0.08 4.25 4.28 0.03
(0.011) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.043)
Manufacturing 0.450 0.335 -0.115 0.464 0.373 -0.091 0.456 0.380 -0.075 0.420 0.403 -0.017
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025)
Service Sector 0.234 0.380 0.147 0.243 0.352 0.109 0.259 0.339 0.079 0.277 0.310 0.033
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023)
Trucking 0.168 0.112 -0.055 0.157 0.123 -0.034 0.146 0.120 -0.025 0.131 0.118 -0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Number of Obs. 6092 4173 4630 2949 2876 2079 886 739
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Entries are means and differences by election outcome, in the full and, three separate sub-samples, by election vote share. Observations include only
those establishments that survive as of the year 2001, and have nonmissing employment."Union Present post-election" (pre-election) indicates whether or not a union at the location of the
establishment filed a contract expiration between the election date and 2001 (between the beginning of the FMCS data and the date of the election). Details of data set construction in the
Data Appendix.